The Reflections of Internal Political Issues in Sino-Burmese Relations

Nyo Ohn Myint



Bilateral relations toward Burma

The Chinese government has often proclaimed that it has a non-interference policy towards the internal affairs of Burma. Burma’s geopolitical situation along China’s borders means that China has a vested interest in defending its neighbor against foreign attempts to destabilize it. China refused to cave into international opposition against Chinese foreign policy. China clearly stated that Burma presently only faces internal conflicts with no bearing on the regional or global political landscape. However, China normally side with its ethical alliance or it provide full support to one side while it ignores other parties. During 60s and 70s, Beijing radio accused late Ne Win's regime as neo capitalism and fascism regime that Beijing supported Burmese communist party. China never stays neutral and side with ethic or realistic calculation. The Chinese government has also stated that unless the current Burmese/Myanmar government requests its intervention, it would not be inclined to interfere in the SPDC’s political micro-management by SPDC.

For nineteen years, the People Republic of China (PRC) has constantly supported the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) in Post Cold War era. China has reviewed its past political of ideological support to the Communist Party of Burma CBP and its new policy assures the Burmese government of its sincere desire to continue friendly relations with it. Indeed, China's present policy towards regionalism is totally different from its previous stance of being a “threat”. Burma particularly enjoys the political stability accompanying China’s new policy towards regionalism.

Sino-Burma relations might be seen primarily as economic relations flourishing without international financial institutions (IFI) support. Burma received no loans from Asia Development Bank (ADB) in 1986, two years before the political uprising against the socialist regime. The junta seized that opportunity to suppress its opposition and refused to hand over power to the National League for Democracy (NLD) in 1990 because the generals wanted to enjoy the "Chinese Marshall Plan for Burma".

Despite China’s previous support of the communists in Burma during the 1960s-70s, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) needed foreign reserves and political support from China. As a result, the "China threat" gradually diminished as a factor in Sino-Burmese relations.

With Beijing "downplaying ideology and moving towards pragmatism" during 1989-90, the junta began courting Chinese loans for modernization of its defense services so as to maintain its long term hold on power and check the threat of the insurgencies of the armed ethnic organizations. The junta literally gained both moral and pragmatic support from Beijing while simultaneously facing ethnic insurgencies and increased political pressures after 1988. SLORC had benefited from Beijing’s "sophisticated diplomacy" of non-interference. It also received less MOU for loans and grants as China reallocated funds towards its political purposes. While in Cambodia in 2004, the ADB’s top executive stressed that Burma's fundamental fiscal practice was spoilt by the Chinese revamp of their foreign policy.

Regardless of the dearth of foreign direct investments, the junta continues to exporting Burmese products. While China may not provide total financial assistance, it has contributed to the building of Burma’s infrastructure, especially the development of hydro power and the improvement of basic human necessities.


Economic liberalism to political influence towards Burma

Since the end of the Cold War, China has redoubled its efforts at economic globalization and the regional grouping of ASEAN has brought benefits for Burma. Burma's isolation no longer has any effect on the regional perspective of economic coordination.

After Burma became a member of ASEAN in 1997, China has grown more confident in its economic cooperation with junta. China's ASEAN policy has greatly benefited Burma. China's soft policy towards regional cooperation with ASEAN has enhanced Burma’s position within the region as well. By increasing its economic ties with ASEAN, China has come to be involved in resolving various disputes, trade differences, and security concerns (all of which included Burma) in many ASEAN-China forums, GMS, ASEAN plus 3 and other multilateral agreements.

In contrast to China’s seemingly full hearted support of the present Burmese military government, other ASEAN members continue to approach Burma with kid gloves. Burma has benefited both politically and financially when it joined ASEAN as the other ASEAN states’ fear of the “China treats” dissipated and Western countries' no longer viewed Burma as a completely “evil state". Similarly, the junta has bolstered its failure to garner foreign direct investment with Chinese loans.

Domestically, the junta has also benefited from China’s "new pragmatic diplomacy" of ensuring peaceful coexistence along its borders. According to KIO senior leaders, China pressured them to accept the ceasefire agreement with Rangoon. This was of mutual interest to both countries; China saw the establishment of peace along its borders as a means of ensuring its economic development. China’s influence over the ethnic armed organizations as well as its diplomatic and political ties enhanced the reputation of the junta.

After the junta's transitional period in power, the junta sought to consolidate its ultimate goal of strengthening defense services from Chinese financial support. The junta deemed China suited for meeting its immediate needs. Indeed, the former head of the Burmese secret service and Prime Minister expressed his pleasure with the Chinese influence over the ethnic Kachin, Wa and Kokunt as it served to improve Burma’s domestic matters.

China also benefited from the ceasefire agreements with the ethnic armed organizations, for its development in Yunnan province depended on Burmese natural resources and exports as well as bilateral trade and investment.


Political Support through Financial Assistance

Despite China's economic expansion and its trade with ASEAN, Burma is no less an important trading partner. As part of its role in GMS, China-ASEAN relations, geographical position, China has to provide loans and grant for infrastructure building, roads, hydro power and other projects promoting Burmese development. All of the monetary funds are link with political agendas and mainly preventing Western ideology into Burma, regardless of SPDC's failed economic policy.

Furthermore, China's financial support is essential to the modernization of Burma’s armed forces. More than one billion US dollars were loaned to the Burmese junta in the early 1990s. After China modernized its military and reduced its size after the Cold War, it had a sizeable surplus of weapons and other military technology in Yunnan. Thus the Yunnan's arms industry gained a patron in the Burmese government so much so that Chinese banks in Yunnan cashed loans to Burma for the purchase of Chinese arms.

According to Chinese reports, over two hundred million dollars are loaned annually to the Burmese government and private banking industry. However, they argued that most of the loans are used to purchase material, machinery, technology; and only ten percent or less are used by the regime. However they admitted that there was no pre-condition on most of the loans and that it was likely that the SPDC could have abused the financial assistance. Once the SPDC received the loans, they had full responsibility for the funds which it could use in any way it liked. [1]

During 2005, some reports claimed that the junta failed to provide interest and repayment, and that China halted the loans during this period. However, it was later revealed that these issues had disappeared. This coincided with the time Khin Nyunt and his security units were purged and jailed.


The Second Wave: Energy needs as a vulnerability

World energy needs and conflicts in the oil rich zones in Middle East alarmed the Chinese so much that they considered alternative energy sources. China's continued economic growth as well as the increased demands for Chinese goods and trade would eventually result in greater energy consumption.

Since China has little interest in Burma’s energy sector as it is already engaged in trade and investment with the country at Yunnan, Yunnan energy companies focused on hydro power plants inside Burma. However, the Middle East conflicts and rise of crude oil costs have added to the burden of economic development and commercial competition. Since China engaged in economic development and trade with international community, the Chinese are definitely in need of energy sources for domestic consumption and industrialization.[2]

The Chinese policymakers are particularly drawn to Burma because it is rich in natural gas and is political dependent on China. During the mid 1990s, China was not interested in Burma’s M1 and M2 natural gas fields or the cost efficiency of natural gas. Instead, other investors and oil industries such as PTT of Thailand, Total of France, and PETRONAS of Malaysia tendered their services and profited from the venture.

In August 2000, the South Korean Daewoo International Corporation signed an exploration agreement with the state-run Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE). This agreement entitled Daewoo to a major stake of the Block A1 gas fields, located off the coast of Arakan State in the Bay of Bengal. This natural gas field is another means for the junta to consolidate its power as the Shwe Gas field is three times bigger than the Yadana and Ye Dagun gas fields in Southern Burma, and it is estimated that it has over eighteen trillion cubic feet of natural gas in its confines.
China has lately demonstrated its interest in purchasing these natural gas fields from the Burmese junta. The two countries had signing a Memorandum of Understanding with Beijing on March 14, 2007 to sell the gas fields from the A-1 and A3 blocks to China.

Burma became of strategic interest to China when Yunnan University professors wrote that its oil pipe lines were the country’s future energy source. The Yunnan Think-tank developed the policy and the Yunnan provincial government approved it in 2004. Thus Burma became strategically important to China in early 2003.

With the discovery of Burma's western natural gas bank attracting new Chinese policy, the Indian government’s oil industry seized this opportunity to convince its neighbor, Bangladesh, of the benefits of having a gas pipeline through its country. In selling Shwe Gas to China, Burma had few hidden political agendas as it was part of the junta’s plan to collaborate with its neighboring countries. Not wanting to lose sight of this opportunity, China rushed forward to seal its contract with the junta immediately succeeding its veto on the Burma issue at the UNSC.


More Political Interest than Economy

China relations with Burma may be broken down as follows: relations with the junta, relations with India via the junta, establishing peace with the ethnic armed groups along the Sino-Burmese border, and most importantly, it served to prevent any external interference from meddling in Sino-Burmese economic relations in Yunnan province. This is because economic and developmental issues are at the forefront of Sino-Burmese bilateral relations.

The Chinese government had seen the necessity to assist Burma after 1988 owing to growing Chinese confidence of the Burmese generals and the diminishing of the China threat after the Cold War. When it withdrew its support to the Burmese Communist Party, the Chinese government confessed that it was wrong to pursue ideological warfare against its neighboring countries.

China had showed no interest in the junta's political development until the opposition failed to successfully install itself in power in 1990. But the Chinese government’s cognizance of the global trend towards democracy in the third world meant that the junta would be pressurized and that the Chinese communist system would be threatened.

Indeed, Sino-Burmese bilateral relations improved after the ceasefires with the ethnic armed groups boosted Burma’s peace and security. China praised the junta's accomplishment in establishing the series of ceasefire agreements among the armed rival ethnic groups. The junta’s legitimacy was further enhanced following Beijing’s approval of the peace that now existed along the Sino-Burmese border.

In 1997, the junta changed its name from SLORC to State Peace and Development Council following China’s recommendation that "Burma must enjoy Peace and Development". According to China, development would not be possible without peace. However much the junta sought to change its image in line with Beijing’s recommendation, Burmese development was still incomparable to that of China because unlike the Chinese communist party and its government, the SPDC lacked adequate legitimacy.

There is no doubt that China carefully approached the junta so as to avoid giving the impression that it was giving Burma advice on political development. The Chinese government was aware that the junta's top leaders had some experience with the communist insurgency in Northern and Central Burma. It did not want the junta to feel the “China threat" and wished that the junta would approach it with enthusiasm. In return, Burmese Communist Party senior leaders who sought refuge in China maintained low profiles and were placed under partial house arrest so as to inspire more trust from the current junta leaders.

However, owing to the arrest of General Khin Nyunt, the junta was thrown into an internal power struggle in 2004. This in turn made the Chinese government distance itself from its relations with Burma. To Beijing’s shock, the junta continued to make contact with it through the Prime Minister. In response, China delayed its loans to the junta in 2004-2005, reasoning that the junta had been remiss in its repayments. The Chinese government further expressed little concern when Than Shwe visited India. Yunnan party leaders went as far as to claim that Than Shwe’s visit to India had no effect on Sino-Burmese bilateral relations.

To salvage its relations with China, the junta sent its new Prime Minister, Soe Win, to Beijing in the post Khin Nyunt era. "Even though there were instances of internal conflict and power struggles within the SPDC, its policy towards China remains unchanged," Soe Win promised his counterpart in Beijing in 2004. He assured Beijing that Burma supported the One-China policy, anti-colonialism and the promotion of Chinese stability.


Approaching NLD in Early Days

The Chinese ambassador to Burma paid a visit to the NLD office soon after the 1990 election where Chinese account and NLD former seniors stressed that he missed to see the NLD’s de facto leader, the late U Kyi Maung, who had been out of the office during his visit. According to Chinese account, the Chinese ambassador was eager to learn of the NLD’s vision for Burma and warned NLD executive members U Khin Maung Swe and late U Kyaw Min that the party ought to have policy towards the military. The ambassador also expressed his desire to see the military and the NLD sharing power during transition following the 1990 election results.

This bilateral discussion had current regime's pressures against NLD and its supporters and eco-social problems instead of any transitional plan. Both two senior leaders sought the role of China in the process of junta's oppression of the people and the country’s other problems. The Chinese desire to play a bigger role in the transitional period coincided with its wish that Western powers should not be given entrée into the region through the NLD. Perhaps the ambassador wanted to know the role of Indian and US embassies in the NLD policy.[3]

The Chinese worried that the NLD's vision of the transitional period held too much uncertainty for the military and ethnic armed groups. The NLD's own vision of national reconciliations, role of military and future stabilization had failed convince China. Moreover, Beijing did not feel that human rights violations, lack of democracy, and previous BSPP weaknesses adequately expressed the junta’s disinterest towards political reform. Chinese ambassadors indeed alarmed the generals and junta later protested the Chinese embassy.

Beijing also felt that both the NLD and SLORC were going different directions and unable to meet the needs of the people. The Chinese embassy wished to play a mediating role in following the 1990 election but it has not shown any interest to mediate in Burma’s political affairs since then.

However, after Daw Aung San Suu Kyi was initially freed in 1996, the economic grew under SPDC corrupted leadership and the NLD was undergoing rehabilitation, China turned its eyes on SPDC and listened to what junta's propaganda and junta accused her as pro-Westerner. Chinese aid enabled the SPDC to effectively bring about ceasefire agreements with the ethnic insurgent groups and successfully launch an offensive against the KNU.

The Chinese government’s pleasure with the junta's management of Burma’s internal political challenges and the student unrests of 1996-99, the successful establishment of ceasefire agreements with ethnic armed groups, economic liberalization and increasing more anti-Western policy stemmed from its desire to diminish international support towards the NLD. In spite of the NLD’s landslide victory in the 1990 general elections, the present state of the NLD seems to have justified Chinese commentators’ worries that the NLD would not be able to bring about more positive reconciliation between the ethnic armed groups and the military government without Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.

The NLD was also cut off to obtain any support from the neighboring countries except India by arresting top leaders who were able to communicate with the embassies. This could be due to the full Chinese support of the SPDC. In 2003, China expressed the opinion that the NLD should go beyond claming political legitimacy, towards the establishment of a concrete vision for the country’s economic development, national reconciliation process, future role of the various ethnic groups, the role of the military and reforms in the other important government functions and bureaucratic mechanism.

In reality, junta's brutality against NLD and its supporters as well as the widespread support of academics willing to participate in the Burmese nation building process after the transitional period did meet with China’s expectations. The Chinese government need to know that NLD's realistic vision for the country's post transitional period might not work as long as junta keeps using brutality suppression and lack of reconciliation notion. Furthermore, it was felt that the NLD alone unable to adequately consider the major challenges of the role of the military, economic development, establishing peace between the ethnic diversity and the military, meeting the demands of the ethnic nationalities in its bid to form a legitimately democratic government. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi is also regarded by China as an icon of democracy rather than a real political figure.


Ethnic diversity as a major issue for China's Burma policy

There are two phases to examining Burma's ethnic issues. The first has to do with how ethnic ethnic nationalities and the SPDC deal with each other. The second lies in the possibility that China may not be interested in the SPDC's micro management. However, China has a vested interested in the overall policy towards the ethnic insurgent groups, the resultant ceasefires, and the role of ethnic political parties in Burma.

China’s concerned with the security of its border with Burma and as an upshot is interested in the ethnic armed groups there. China has reportedly suggested to Khin Nyunt and the junta that a border area development ministry ought to be established so as to improve the way of living, development, security coordination and other national security matters as China has done.

China is desirous of promoting the ethnic nationalities’ ways of living, promoting alternative income sources for them, enhancing minority rights, improving ethnic nationalities’ relations with local authorities, as well as promoting affirmative actions towards education, taxation, and business opportunities.

According to the records, however, Khin Nyunt was unable to institute the correct processes and mechanism; indeed, the ceasefire groups seemed above the law. Unlike the Chinese ethnic nationalities in Yunnan Province, the ceasefire groups ventured into local companies for their income, and expanded to participate in the national banking industries. In the beginning, the junta tolerated these business activities not only in the ceasefire areas but in former capital Rangoon and Mandalay as well. Khin Nyunt usually gave these ceasefire groups a blank check for their endeavors. According to Khin Nyunt’s former aide, Khin Nyunt never reported what was going on to his superiors. Than Shwe and Maung Aye were reportedly ignorant of Khin Nyunt’s activities. He used his intelligence units for ceasefire groups' activities. The junta had to stamp out these corrupt practices.

In this case, the Chinese simply avoided notifying these troubles in the post ceasefire agreements. Obviously, the Chinese kept quiet despite knowing of Khin Nyunt’s favorable attitudes towards the ceasefire groups. This provided much needed stability at the Sino-Burmese border. However, when Khin Nyunt was arrested, the tension and distrust between the SPDC and ceasefire groups grew. In response, China maintained its non-intervention stance and refused to confront the junta and did not meddle in the SPDC’s micro management and military expansion except in the UWSA's special zone. Despite this policy of non-intervention, China was genuinely concerned with the situation in Burma and remained a keen advocate of ethnic reconciliation between the ethnic armed groups and the junta.

When the SPDC drafted a new constitution, it could not reduce any fear of the ethnic ceasefire groups' concerns. According to the new constitution, there would be no role for the armed groups outside the defense ministry. The ceasefire groups would have no choice but to disarm under the terms of the new constitution. The constitution would not bring any political benefits to the ethnic nationalities. China voiced its concerned with this new constitution in late 2006. According to Beijing, it wanted to see a greater role for ethnic nationalities in both the NLD’s and the SPDC’s future policy. The Chinese government also reportedly floated the alternative policy of "demilitarized zone" so as to promote stability in the ethnic insurgent areas.

Ethnic ceasefire groups' leaders approached the Chinese government in Yunnan and Beijing in the hope that the disunity and instability wrought by the junta’s proposed constitution would be reduced. This move on the ethnic ceasefire groups' leaders’ part alarmed Beijing and the Chinese government reportedly told the junta to review its tough stance. Beijing said that there would be no stability and development if the majority Burmans downplays the role of ethnic nationalities. They suggest that the NLD seriously consider paying attention to the calls for ethnic inclusiveness in the reconciliation process.

Thus the junta has no choice but to maintain peace at the Sino-Burmese border. The Chinese government extracted the junta’s promise to promote peace and development in the border areas.


Junta's down-turn economy and Chinese concerns

The Chinese authorities in Beijing and Yunnan have different perspectives in trade and development. Beijing is confident that Burma’s economic policy of open door, its efforts at liberalizing the market economy, the GMS[4], Mekong River development and cooperation would enhance Burmese economic growth in Asia. Yunnan officials on the other hand feel that the SPDC's mismanagement of the economy would have far reaching results.

Despite their awareness of the junta’s corruption and failed policy towards the ethnic armed groups and democratic opponents, the Chinese authorities still persisted in their policy of non-intervention. Thus, Chinese businessmen had to deal with both the SPDC and the officials overseeing the ceasefire agreements if they wished to conduct business activities in Burma.

Burma's Irrawaddy waterway to Bamaw, Kachin State, Bamaw and the Yunnan rail road would provide an alternative route to rapidly improve and develop the Yunnan economy. Beijing and Yunnan want Burma to invest in the Chinese infrastructure and promote a more liberal economic policy. China is keen to reap the benefits of economic globalization, and regionalization to improve its economic connection with the ASEAN member countries. Burma is very important to China for improving its economic efficiency and growth.[5]

Indeed, the Chinese people in Yunnan are dependent on its border trade, exports and imports, investment and natural resources from Burma for its regional manufacturing base. The Yunnan authorities expected the SPDC to improve its basic infrastructure to benefit Yunnan export products. While Yunnan businesses are totally dependent on Burma's raw products, they have to pay through their noses for any Burmese material. Although the Chinese government believed that trade with Burma would yield much profit, the political and economic situation there would be too difficult to predict owing to the junta’s frequent changes in policy, rules and regulations.

In response, the Yunnan authorities have decided to cooperate with Burma to reduce the economic gap between the two regions. Yunnan wanted to speed up the development of the Burmese infrastructure so as to transform Burma into its next major market. Yunnan expected the ADB to provide loans and grants to improve Burma's economy through the GMS. According to the ADB secretariat in 2005, the ADB is still reluctant to issue loans to Burma through the GMS to improve the regionalization in the Southeast Asian region regardless of China’s willingness to vouch for Burma. The ADB cited Burma's inflation and lowered GDP as reasons for denying the loan.

Undoubtedly, Burma is a major export market for Yunnan; Chinese products are relatively cheaper than Thai and Indian products. With decreasing Burmese income and declining cost of living, Chinese goods are in high demand. During Khin Nyunt’s era, Chinese merchants and traders were free to travel without passports, and there were no tariffs on Chinese exports to Burma, and Chinese merchants enjoyed more profits by dealing with the corrupt intelligence units overseen by Khin Nyunt.


Concluding Remarks

Given the current political situation in Burma, it is in China’s interest to promote better economic relations with it. China's basic policy towards Burma is always independent from Western efforts to democratize Burma. China may not be comfortable with any weaker government in the transitional period as it is bound to enter into a power struggle with the military; it would also have to resolve the issues of the ethnic armed groups and conceptualize a policy for the promotion of ethnic diversity and better economic policy. Current China policy towards Burma may be viewed as reality approach and support towards regime to keep its major share of influence. China does no care the ethic as other super and mega powers do. However, the notion of Chinese support to either BCP or SPDC, they consider that they have legitimacy to do so.

China needs Burma to be politically stable if it is to benefit. For the past nineteen years, the SPDC has been credited with maintaining security and political stability. However, it has also run the country’s economic and social conditions to the ground. The Chinese government has offered Burma many suggestions as how it should handle the economy, ethnic nationalities, as well as how it should draft the new constitution. The Chinese government still believes that it can play a role in liberalizing the economy of Burma; after all, if the Chinese Communist Party can successfully make the transition from a state-managed economy to a market economy, the SPDC could do the same.

Although regional economic integration has not worked in favor of the SPDC, it has made Burma more politically stable. China feels that the current SPDC government is a transitional administration that ought to model itself after the Chinese model. The junta's willingness to remain on close ties with China signals its acceptance of Chinese political and economic support.

However, internal conflicts within the SPDC, as well as the joint pressures of the NLD and with the generation ‘88 political activities have made the Chinese wary of the Burmese situation. The junta's policy towards India and Russia after ASEAN abandoned Burma has alarmed China too. Thus, the Chinese Prime Minister’s Office has been reviewing its policy to Burma since 2004 after the Depayin ambush and downfall of Khin Nyunt.

Junta has to conclude the National Convention which tends to be a bridge between predominance of military in Burma's politics to military rules civilian government regardless of junta hardliners resist. Current junta's deformation of any armed ethnic groups directly threats the Chinese concerns. National Convention brings to an end of the ceasefire groups' continuation and its own political roadmap in 1990. China is fully aware that new constitution is a beginning the new round of conflicts in political and physical means.



[1] Altogether twelve agreements, Exchanges of Notes and memoranda of understanding [MOU] were signed between the two countries. They are (1) Agreement on Economic and Technical Cooperation between the Government of the Union of Myanmar and the Government of the People’s Republic of China (2) Exchange of Notes on the Project of the International Convention Centre (3) Exchange of Notes on the Master Plan for Hydropower Projects in Myanmar (4) Exchange of Notes on the Master Plan for Thanlyin-Kyauktan Industrial Zone (5) Exchange of Notes extending 50 million RMB Yuan interest free loan for the provision and shipment of rails for the Myanmar Government (6) MoU between the Ministry of Communications, Posts and Telegraphs of the Union of Myanmar and the Ministry of Information Industry of the People’s Republic of China in the field of information and communications (7) Agreement on the Financing Plan for No.4 Urea Fertilizer Factory at Taikkyi between the Export-Import Bank of China and the Ministry of Finance and Revenue of the Union of Myanmar (8) Debt Reschedulling Agreement between China Export and Credit Insurance Corporation and the Ministry of Finance and Revenue of the Union of Myanmar (9) Supply Contract for Myanmar National Telecommunication and ZTE Corporation (10) Tagaung Taung Nickle Mineral Exploration and Feasibility Study Agreement between No.3 Mining Enterprise and China Non-ferrous Metal Mining and Construction Co. Ltd (11) MoU between the Ministry of Industry 1 of the Union of Myanmar and China Metallurgical Construction [group] Corporation for Extension of 200 TPD Pulp Plant [Thabaung] and Proposed 500 TPD Plant [Rakhine] (12) Supply Contract between Myanmar Posts and Tele-communications and ZTE Corporation for GSM system Expansion Project.

[2] According to the Chinese, the Chinese academics and government officials developed the project of oil pipeline between Burma Maulmin deep seaport and Kunming, Yunnan Province. This project is considered by Yunnan Governor and “he is very much interested in supporting the project.” The Chinese are thinking about time and cost on the project. “We could save a time and money if we have an alternative route” said by Chinese. They have proposed the military regime and regime agreed to do so. Normally this idea has been floating around the Chinese authorities long ago, but few months ago they developed into program team to survey in Burma, pipeline route, support and other needs. But on the other hand Beijing will have a political motive in this project.

[3] Interviewed with former senior NLD leaders, youth leaders and who witnessed this event, also questioned U Khin Maung Swe who led the meeting with Chinese ambassador in 2006.
[4] Initiated by the Asian Development Bank, the GMS-Economic Cooperation was founded in 1992 to bring together China, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam along the Mekong River. The 4,500-km Mekong River originates from China's Qinghai and runs through Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam down to South China Sea near Ho Chi Minh City. The GMS has a combined land area of nearly 2.3 million square- kilometers and home to more than 250 million people.
[5] During President Jiang Zemin visit to Burma in December 2001, besides they signed many agreements but Gen Than Shwe refused to sign the Irrawaddy water way project which link Indian Ocean and Yunnan province that would also allow a strategic gateway for the Chinese western part and defense purpose. The Chinese were unhappy with Gen Than Shwe decision but never expressed their unhappiness. Although Chinese officials did not elaborate, Beijing agreed to increase its financial support for infrastructural projects in the coming years.