The Burma Fund
Research paper 01-04
1-20-2004
edited on 01-12-2008
The Western countries' outrageous regarding Burma’s violent political crackdown on the Buddhist monks, student leaders, citizens and NLD could not convince the regional and neighboring countries to change their stance in the post-September Revolution. Even after the ASEAN's abandoned its constructive engagement but its members Thailand and Singapore kept positive approach to the SPDC. Yet, neighboring countries, namely Thailand, India and China are rejecting various international pressures on the SPDC due to their geopolitical and commercial interests on Burma. The ASEAN's constructive engagement failed to reform the political backwardness in Burma but these three countries have to seek another approach of flexible engagement which could have more flexibility with the SPDC. In fact, these neighboring countries have different interests and perspectives, but they have a mutual interest which is Burma must be stabilized under any form of government.
These three countries used regionalism to create the constructive approach in their policy towards Burma. Two regional powers, China and India, and Thaksin's regional ambitions on Burma can been seen since year of 2002.[HM1] Lately see these three countries challenging any political and economic pressures from various parts of the world. All three countries have huge economic and political interests in Burma, and they intend to extend their markets to the cross region throughout Burma as well as extend their market share in Burma. In fact, Thailand and China were worried about the US economic recession in 2001.[1] Both have to consider a new market place in the region rather than waiting for normality of the US economy.
Thailand aggressively observed the Chinese and Indian consuming power and Chinese cheap goods rolling into Thailand and India from time to time. But the question is which institutions could link these three countries' unilateral interests of cutting costs in transportation. The ASEAN-China free trade Agreement, and ASEAN-Japan coordination, the Greater Mekong Sub-region economic development programs have been being introduced in the region. However, these three countries mutual interest of extension of bigger economic zone with lower transportation cost was delayed by the political crisis in Burma. Burma lies on these three countries’ strategic interest.[2]
All three countries did not openly oppose the Western's perspective; instead they silently assist the SPDC to have the best option for their interests. Interestingly, they have worked closely with each other in post-Depayin ambush for Burma. These countries have discussed the Burma issue on every occasion during past six months. This does not mean that they have been concerning about the deterioration of the NLD’s political functions nor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's wellbeing. Nor have them pushed aggressively the SPDC to transform the political system to democracy as soon as possible. They are working on Burma's political transformation in such a way that their common economic and politics interests will be secured. This regional approach is working to slow the forceful political changes and instability in Burma by any means possible. This has made it difficult to formulate democratic and transitional goals, and to encourage possible dialogue between the NLD and the SPDC. It is unclear that how to best proceed towards democratization in the SPDC's upcoming National Convention.
The SPDC has replaced Gen Khin Nyunt as a new prime minister during Gen Maung Aye's visit to China in September 2003. The SPDC, its hardcore supporter China has faced unexpected pressures from moderate Western countries and Japan. The first few weeks after the Depayin ambush, the SPDC employed its foreign minister Win Aung as a spokesperson to face the world's disapproval. But, things did not improve after the ASEAN ministerial level meeting in Phnom Penh in June 2003 despite ASEAN abandoning their principle of non-interference in member countries’ domestic matters and leveling strong objections to the SPDC’s actions against the NLD and its’ leader, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. This came after many Western countries expressed their regret and outrage at the SPDC's brutal action.[3]
Under the various pressures, Gen Than Shwe's diplomatic missions led by Win Aung and Khin Maung Win went to the region and Japan with the pictures of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and Gen Than Shwe led top SPDC leaders during the confidence-building period in 2002 throughout the region included Japan. But both ASEAN countries and Japan did not impress with the SPDC's diplomatic approach. The generals’ approach failed to improve the SPDC’s image even in the region. [4] The SPDC has to have a different approach to the international community as well as the regional players. But the bottom line for the SPDC is to avoid a direct dialogue with the NLD, to continue to ignore the 1990 election results and to refuse to allow any independent body to investigate the Depayin ambush. The SPDC has to keep these controversial issues away from the international community. Rather than respond to the various ASEAN countries' different approaches that they want making sure the regional players would accept their grand plan. But the SPDC needs help from the region and picked Thailand as their first defender and China as a major economic backup to resist any potential threats from outside the region.
The SPDC needed a new face to mislead the international community and release the worries of regional players. In fact, according to Gen Khin Nyunt, he had little or nothing to do with USDA's functions before and during the attack on Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and her supporters near Depayin. It is obvious that the USDA was conducted directly from Gen Than Shwe and his man Gen Soe Win who became a secretary one in the SPDC after the Depayin ambush. Thus, the SPDC has to choose Gen Khin Nyunt as a new prime minister and to lead the new cabinet in order to repair its image. Yet, off and on during past fifteen years he has been known to be very close with the Thai government as well as a moderate or reformer in the region. Thus, he could ease a major concern of the ASEAN leaders that Burma might threaten the regional stability and eventually those who didn't need to confront Burma's internal crisis.
Needless to say, the SPDC knew well about the structure of ASEAN's mechanism and weaknesses. The ASEAN interest is that Burma should not be a major issue for ASEAN. Khin Nyunt was able to manage the various concerns and responses from the ASEAN leaders during the Bali summit in early of October. Before Gen Khin Nyunt's face to face meeting with the leaders from ASEAN, the ASEAN pressures certainly were minimized by itself in Bali. The ASEAN wanted to see any kind of SPDC political initiative of democratization regardless of its feasibility as any announcement of political reform plan of SPDC could improve the region's image.[5]
Thailand, a major defender of the SPDC
The Thai government has had many national security issues and ecological interests regarding Burma since 1988. Bilateral interest with China and India also encourage the Thai authorities to assist the SPDC to be in a better position. Following the Bali summit, Thailand pulled out of Burma's political crisis as an issue from the APEC summit in Bangkok, and asked other counterparts to provide a new Prime Minister Khin Nyunt with more time to do for democratization in Burma during the APEC meeting in Bangkok. Burma was not a member in the APEC summit but ASEAN leaders headed by Thaksin had more opportunity to contain the US pressures on the ASEAN towards Burma. In fact, Bangkok has received very insightful information and advice from the UN special envoy Razali who failed to secure Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's freedom during his visit to Burma post-Depayin.[6]
On 15th December 2003, the Thai government arranged for the regional and international countries to sit together to discuss the Burma crisis, but the SPDC failed to give a proper time frame and provided a controversial seven points roadmap. Many are questioning if it is a real tool for productive political development or not. But, Thai leaders kept saying that current SPDC leaders are stepping in the right direction and try to reduce the international pressures on them, even though the SPDC paid little or no attention on "Burma Forum."[7] However, this first round of Burma Forum also somewhat minimized the international pressures of freeing Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the rest of the political prisoners and to start the political dialogue with NLD.
However, Gen Khin Nyunt could not reach his goal at the ASEAN-Japan summit[8] in Tokyo in early December of 2003. Japan's strict sanctions would not allow Gen Khin Nyunt wishes of normality and even more humanitarian assistance in. Before he went to Tokyo, he coincidently worked on the ceasefire talk with KNU top leader General Saw Bo Mya through his deputies in terms of hoping to have any financial assistance from Japan during the ASEAN-Japan summit.[9] This opportunity to have a verbal ceasefire agreement with KNU also proved that the country is moving towards stability and political development during his trip to Japan and ready to receive development assistance from the Asia Development Bank and the Japanese government.[10] Moreover, the SPDC would not stop and the SPDC will try humanitarian assistance and ODA from Japan within a few months after they have a ceasefire agreement with KNU. [11]
The multilateral financial institutions like the ADB[12], World Bank, and IMF could create or transform the economic corridor between South Asia, Southeast Asia and China with providing multibillion investments in intra-continental projects. But the last decision of Japan on Burma also affected these three countries' economic interest. Burma is, in fact, sitting on the GMS's North-West[13] and East-West[14] economic corridors. This is Thailand’s major economic interest in the region and they do not want to see any delay or political instability in Burma.
China's new policy of democratization in Burma
The Chinese mainly focus on a geo-strategic approach towards Burma in the past decade and they still believe that the military government is able to maintain law and order inside Burma regardless of mounting international pressure. During the past twenty years, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has pushed tremendous economic reforms; decentralization in the major industrial and agricultural sectors, and supported the privatization of small and medium size businesses throughout the country. They have also established industrialized zones; market orientated strategy, and supported local industries and factories for new market place in the early 1980s.[15]
Under the SPDC/SLORC era, Burma became China's dependent state and gateway of Southeast Asia and South Asia. The Chinese expected the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS) economic cooperation and development programs to pave the cross border trade trough the GMS region that includes Yunnan, Burma, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam. Even so, Beijing is focusing on stability in Burma while Yunnan wanted its local businesses and investments to go deeper into Burma, and both local and central authorities realized that the SPDC's stability is the best benefit for China, but this notion is unlikely to continue in the future.
In fact, the current Chinese foreign policy towards Burma is linked to ASEAN responses, the US and EU reactions, the Pacific Rim countries like Japan, Australia and other stakeholders like the United Nations.[16] However, both Yunnan and Beijing authorities seemed to be aware that the international pressures transformed a very negative impact on the SPDC after May 30th ambush. In the very beginning, the Chinese authorities have strongly opposed any international interference and political crisis as an internal affair in terms of protecting its bilateral strong ties with the SPDC.[17] At the same time, the Chinese rushed to hear more from the SPDC and its' alternative approach both domestically and internationally. But Maung Aye did not convince the Chinese for the SPDC action against the NLD.[18] General Maung Aye repeated the Chinese that the SPDC would be working with ethnic nationalities which General Than Shwe discussed with Chinese leaders during state visit in January 2003 and other political parties which were meant to include the NLD. Yet, he also stressed that the SPDC has worked with many good neighbors such as Thailand and India.[19]
India, the last country to deal with the SPDC post-Depayin
Indo-Burmese relations have improved remarkably in 2002. The Asian highway projects and other bilateral interests between the two countries made them closer than ever. India finally abandoned its policy of strongly rejecting the military government and lowest relations after 1988. India becomes the last actor of post Depayin ambush after Chinese distanced with the regime in regional forums. The Indian government has been closely watching for any bilateral relations and other developments between China and Burma since then. Indian foreign policy towards Burma might be reviewed based on weakening opposition effectiveness, following the Chinese influence in areas of economics and politics, and unavoidable economic coordination with SPDC. Thus, the old policy cannot be utilized with Burma.
Both countries have shown their willingness of having better relations during Indian Vice-President Bhairon Singh Shekhawat's state visit; he had held a series of talks with General Than Shwe in Rangoon the first week of November 2003. The Burmese counterpart also promised to eject the anti-Indian armed groups from the Indo-Burmese border. After the Vice president’s visit to Burma, there was harsh treatment towards Burmese refugees in India who protested in New Delhi.[20]
India’s main interest of having an Asian Highway from its Eastern border town Mora to Mae Sot in Thailand, and energy needs from natural gas[21] from Arakan state in Burma. Both economic interest and deeper relations, and reaching its influence with SPDC could provide the Indian government to play in the region effectively. The Indian government showed interest in promoting its national security, trade and economic coordination with the SPDC.[22]
The Indian interest of border trade, new highway project to Thailand has increased during the past few years, and to improve economy in eastern states are depending on Burma coordination in a very near future. Yet the Indians could not afford to lose the second opportunity with Burma in terms of having trade interest, regionalization, new market in ASEAN and China through Burma.
Conclusively, current development between KNU and the SPDC is not securing the regional stability and security that is wanted by ASEAN and China. But ASEAN seemed to withdraw its realistic approach to the SPDC until 2006 when Burma becomes a chair of the ASEAN. However, three neighboring countries are somewhat supporting the SPDC's post Depayin political development. India, China and Thailand have seen the Burma's political deadlock as a major obstacle to regional development and economic opportunity.
The SPDC's seven point roadmap and its National Convention and the new position of General Khin Nyunt were believed to have been decided in consultation with the Chinese during General Maung Aye’s visit to China in August 2003. Both General Than Shwe and General Maung Aye led SPDC military council and General Khin Nyunt's SPDC new cabinet working towards the marginalization of the NLD role in the political development. Both teams play harmonically on domestic and international concerns in the very beginning. Since the first week of October 2003, the local, state and division level USDA have organized the rally of supporting Khin Nyunt's seven points road map.[23] The SPDC has a grand strategy of reintroducing the national convention to avoid the political dialogue with the NLD in order to escape the international pressures.[24]
No matter how Western countries wish to see Burma’s transformation to democratization n faster way, these three countries have to consult with their interests first and they have to conduct political changes in Burma without affecting their economic and political interest. They cannot see Burma from the Western state’s perspective; moreover they have to pick the notion of Asian values as the best excuse for them not to pressure the barbaric regime. But they realize that without the NLD in the political process they could not bring the country development or any stability in the region in terms of lack of legitimacy of the SPDC.
[1] Far Eastern Economic Review 2003 Nov.17
[2] Dr Walden Bello "Possible scenarios of economic development in Burma" DHF workshop in Chiang Mai, Thailand, 15th December 2003
[3] The Cambodia Daily News, June 17th 2003
[4] Gen Than Shwe signed a statement and U Win Aung had to debrief of DASSK has planed to coup on 18th June 2004 to the neighboring countries and Japan.
[5] "ASEAN needs to make sure that this very issue [of Suu Kyi] will not steal the attention, both of ASEAN member countries themselves and the international community, about the important issues that will be addressed in the summit," said a media relations officer at Indonesia’s Foreign Ministry before Bali summit on 6th of October 2003. Irrawaddy Publishing Group
[6] Irrawaddy Online December 15, 2003
[7] The Nations, December 17th 2003
[8] Japan is ASEAN’s second-largest trading partner and investor, after the US. The group’s trade with Japan was worth an estimated US $122.9 billion in 2002. Japan supplied 60 percent of the region’s overseas aid in 2001.
[9] Khin Nyunt told the Japan Broadcasting Corp (NHK) on Monday that he wished Japan would earmark more economic assistance for his country. "To push for the democratization of our country, it is important that we build a solid economic foundation," he said. "Japan’s current economic assistance is not enough, but I believe Japan would extend a helping hand." New Light of Myanmar
[10] Gen Khin Nyunt told Gen Mya of KNU in Rangoon, Burma on KNU peace tour, Jan 2004
[11] Japan suspended economic assistance to Burma in June, after the military government detained opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi following a clash between her supporters and a pro-junta mob on May 30.
[12] ADB is a major pillar among the region’s developing countries to reducing the poverty level, catalyzing rural development, major investment in the infrastructures, educations and other health care along with other financial institutions.
[13] North-West Corridor of GMS economic program area covers Yunnan province of China, Burma, Laos and Thailand, which will finance building of major infrastructure, poverty reduction and hydro power programs
[14] Which covers Cambodia, Thailand and Burma and done pre-investment study and it showed that numerous trade and production opportunities if this program could start in before year of 2012.
[15] The Chinese authorities in Yunnan, September 2003
[16] China Morning News, December 4th, 2003
[17] Sinhu News Agency, 18 June 2003
[18] Yunnan province political research department
[19] Inter press service, Bangkok August 26. This was one of the key issues that emerged during last week's visit to China by Gen Maung Aye, Burma's second most important military leader. Although largely a military visit, China's leaders discussed Burma's internal situation at length with Gen Maung Aye. After all, he is one of the three men who run the country. It is the lack of economic development that is currently worrying China's policymakers. They fear economic shortages could lead to social unrest--and this is something that worries Beijing most.
[20] November 13, 2003—Over 70 people were hospitalized yesterday after Indian police crushed a demonstration by Burmese asylum seekers at the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) office in New Delhi, according to an eyewitness. IPG
[21] The exploration work in the block, designated A-1, is being carried out by two South Korean companies, Daewoo International and KOGAS, and two Indian state-owned companies, the Oil and Natural Gas Commission and the Gas Authority of India. GAIL India chairman Proshanto Banerjee said: "I expect commercial production to start in 2006-07. In the next 5-6 months, we will have to assess the availability of gas, the transport options and the route to take."
[22] India today announced a 57m-dollar line of credit to Myanmar (Burma), which gave an assurance that it would not allow its territory to be used for anti-India activities. "The India-Myanmar Joint Trade Committee has proposed to raise the turnover to $1 billion in the next three years through expansion and diversification of trade. This is a challenging but feasible task," Vice President BhaironSingh Shekhawat told the captains of Myanmarese industry. (Hindustan Times, Nov. 3, 2003)
[23] It hardly to say promoting of his own popularity is part of the anti-DASS strategy or his own intention. Since public relays were conducted throughout the country, the military intelligent personnel asked the NLD party members to support his in Shan, Kachin and Karenni states, and Mandalay and other upper Burma
[24] Freedom of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi was died down in the late 2003; his news covered most of the international and domestic. The SPDC could easily divide the Depayin crisis to roadmap in the ceasefire and other democratic forces inside and outside as well the regional countries, even the Burmese language media from the US and UK.
[HM1]What is the main point of this sentence: that all 3 countries have regional ambitions towards Burma …?
The Western countries' outrageous regarding Burma’s violent political crackdown on the Buddhist monks, student leaders, citizens and NLD could not convince the regional and neighboring countries to change their stance in the post-September Revolution. Even after the ASEAN's abandoned its constructive engagement but its members Thailand and Singapore kept positive approach to the SPDC. Yet, neighboring countries, namely Thailand, India and China are rejecting various international pressures on the SPDC due to their geopolitical and commercial interests on Burma. The ASEAN's constructive engagement failed to reform the political backwardness in Burma but these three countries have to seek another approach of flexible engagement which could have more flexibility with the SPDC. In fact, these neighboring countries have different interests and perspectives, but they have a mutual interest which is Burma must be stabilized under any form of government.
These three countries used regionalism to create the constructive approach in their policy towards Burma. Two regional powers, China and India, and Thaksin's regional ambitions on Burma can been seen since year of 2002.[HM1] Lately see these three countries challenging any political and economic pressures from various parts of the world. All three countries have huge economic and political interests in Burma, and they intend to extend their markets to the cross region throughout Burma as well as extend their market share in Burma. In fact, Thailand and China were worried about the US economic recession in 2001.[1] Both have to consider a new market place in the region rather than waiting for normality of the US economy.
Thailand aggressively observed the Chinese and Indian consuming power and Chinese cheap goods rolling into Thailand and India from time to time. But the question is which institutions could link these three countries' unilateral interests of cutting costs in transportation. The ASEAN-China free trade Agreement, and ASEAN-Japan coordination, the Greater Mekong Sub-region economic development programs have been being introduced in the region. However, these three countries mutual interest of extension of bigger economic zone with lower transportation cost was delayed by the political crisis in Burma. Burma lies on these three countries’ strategic interest.[2]
All three countries did not openly oppose the Western's perspective; instead they silently assist the SPDC to have the best option for their interests. Interestingly, they have worked closely with each other in post-Depayin ambush for Burma. These countries have discussed the Burma issue on every occasion during past six months. This does not mean that they have been concerning about the deterioration of the NLD’s political functions nor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's wellbeing. Nor have them pushed aggressively the SPDC to transform the political system to democracy as soon as possible. They are working on Burma's political transformation in such a way that their common economic and politics interests will be secured. This regional approach is working to slow the forceful political changes and instability in Burma by any means possible. This has made it difficult to formulate democratic and transitional goals, and to encourage possible dialogue between the NLD and the SPDC. It is unclear that how to best proceed towards democratization in the SPDC's upcoming National Convention.
The SPDC has replaced Gen Khin Nyunt as a new prime minister during Gen Maung Aye's visit to China in September 2003. The SPDC, its hardcore supporter China has faced unexpected pressures from moderate Western countries and Japan. The first few weeks after the Depayin ambush, the SPDC employed its foreign minister Win Aung as a spokesperson to face the world's disapproval. But, things did not improve after the ASEAN ministerial level meeting in Phnom Penh in June 2003 despite ASEAN abandoning their principle of non-interference in member countries’ domestic matters and leveling strong objections to the SPDC’s actions against the NLD and its’ leader, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. This came after many Western countries expressed their regret and outrage at the SPDC's brutal action.[3]
Under the various pressures, Gen Than Shwe's diplomatic missions led by Win Aung and Khin Maung Win went to the region and Japan with the pictures of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and Gen Than Shwe led top SPDC leaders during the confidence-building period in 2002 throughout the region included Japan. But both ASEAN countries and Japan did not impress with the SPDC's diplomatic approach. The generals’ approach failed to improve the SPDC’s image even in the region. [4] The SPDC has to have a different approach to the international community as well as the regional players. But the bottom line for the SPDC is to avoid a direct dialogue with the NLD, to continue to ignore the 1990 election results and to refuse to allow any independent body to investigate the Depayin ambush. The SPDC has to keep these controversial issues away from the international community. Rather than respond to the various ASEAN countries' different approaches that they want making sure the regional players would accept their grand plan. But the SPDC needs help from the region and picked Thailand as their first defender and China as a major economic backup to resist any potential threats from outside the region.
The SPDC needed a new face to mislead the international community and release the worries of regional players. In fact, according to Gen Khin Nyunt, he had little or nothing to do with USDA's functions before and during the attack on Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and her supporters near Depayin. It is obvious that the USDA was conducted directly from Gen Than Shwe and his man Gen Soe Win who became a secretary one in the SPDC after the Depayin ambush. Thus, the SPDC has to choose Gen Khin Nyunt as a new prime minister and to lead the new cabinet in order to repair its image. Yet, off and on during past fifteen years he has been known to be very close with the Thai government as well as a moderate or reformer in the region. Thus, he could ease a major concern of the ASEAN leaders that Burma might threaten the regional stability and eventually those who didn't need to confront Burma's internal crisis.
Needless to say, the SPDC knew well about the structure of ASEAN's mechanism and weaknesses. The ASEAN interest is that Burma should not be a major issue for ASEAN. Khin Nyunt was able to manage the various concerns and responses from the ASEAN leaders during the Bali summit in early of October. Before Gen Khin Nyunt's face to face meeting with the leaders from ASEAN, the ASEAN pressures certainly were minimized by itself in Bali. The ASEAN wanted to see any kind of SPDC political initiative of democratization regardless of its feasibility as any announcement of political reform plan of SPDC could improve the region's image.[5]
Thailand, a major defender of the SPDC
The Thai government has had many national security issues and ecological interests regarding Burma since 1988. Bilateral interest with China and India also encourage the Thai authorities to assist the SPDC to be in a better position. Following the Bali summit, Thailand pulled out of Burma's political crisis as an issue from the APEC summit in Bangkok, and asked other counterparts to provide a new Prime Minister Khin Nyunt with more time to do for democratization in Burma during the APEC meeting in Bangkok. Burma was not a member in the APEC summit but ASEAN leaders headed by Thaksin had more opportunity to contain the US pressures on the ASEAN towards Burma. In fact, Bangkok has received very insightful information and advice from the UN special envoy Razali who failed to secure Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's freedom during his visit to Burma post-Depayin.[6]
On 15th December 2003, the Thai government arranged for the regional and international countries to sit together to discuss the Burma crisis, but the SPDC failed to give a proper time frame and provided a controversial seven points roadmap. Many are questioning if it is a real tool for productive political development or not. But, Thai leaders kept saying that current SPDC leaders are stepping in the right direction and try to reduce the international pressures on them, even though the SPDC paid little or no attention on "Burma Forum."[7] However, this first round of Burma Forum also somewhat minimized the international pressures of freeing Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the rest of the political prisoners and to start the political dialogue with NLD.
However, Gen Khin Nyunt could not reach his goal at the ASEAN-Japan summit[8] in Tokyo in early December of 2003. Japan's strict sanctions would not allow Gen Khin Nyunt wishes of normality and even more humanitarian assistance in. Before he went to Tokyo, he coincidently worked on the ceasefire talk with KNU top leader General Saw Bo Mya through his deputies in terms of hoping to have any financial assistance from Japan during the ASEAN-Japan summit.[9] This opportunity to have a verbal ceasefire agreement with KNU also proved that the country is moving towards stability and political development during his trip to Japan and ready to receive development assistance from the Asia Development Bank and the Japanese government.[10] Moreover, the SPDC would not stop and the SPDC will try humanitarian assistance and ODA from Japan within a few months after they have a ceasefire agreement with KNU. [11]
The multilateral financial institutions like the ADB[12], World Bank, and IMF could create or transform the economic corridor between South Asia, Southeast Asia and China with providing multibillion investments in intra-continental projects. But the last decision of Japan on Burma also affected these three countries' economic interest. Burma is, in fact, sitting on the GMS's North-West[13] and East-West[14] economic corridors. This is Thailand’s major economic interest in the region and they do not want to see any delay or political instability in Burma.
China's new policy of democratization in Burma
The Chinese mainly focus on a geo-strategic approach towards Burma in the past decade and they still believe that the military government is able to maintain law and order inside Burma regardless of mounting international pressure. During the past twenty years, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has pushed tremendous economic reforms; decentralization in the major industrial and agricultural sectors, and supported the privatization of small and medium size businesses throughout the country. They have also established industrialized zones; market orientated strategy, and supported local industries and factories for new market place in the early 1980s.[15]
Under the SPDC/SLORC era, Burma became China's dependent state and gateway of Southeast Asia and South Asia. The Chinese expected the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS) economic cooperation and development programs to pave the cross border trade trough the GMS region that includes Yunnan, Burma, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam. Even so, Beijing is focusing on stability in Burma while Yunnan wanted its local businesses and investments to go deeper into Burma, and both local and central authorities realized that the SPDC's stability is the best benefit for China, but this notion is unlikely to continue in the future.
In fact, the current Chinese foreign policy towards Burma is linked to ASEAN responses, the US and EU reactions, the Pacific Rim countries like Japan, Australia and other stakeholders like the United Nations.[16] However, both Yunnan and Beijing authorities seemed to be aware that the international pressures transformed a very negative impact on the SPDC after May 30th ambush. In the very beginning, the Chinese authorities have strongly opposed any international interference and political crisis as an internal affair in terms of protecting its bilateral strong ties with the SPDC.[17] At the same time, the Chinese rushed to hear more from the SPDC and its' alternative approach both domestically and internationally. But Maung Aye did not convince the Chinese for the SPDC action against the NLD.[18] General Maung Aye repeated the Chinese that the SPDC would be working with ethnic nationalities which General Than Shwe discussed with Chinese leaders during state visit in January 2003 and other political parties which were meant to include the NLD. Yet, he also stressed that the SPDC has worked with many good neighbors such as Thailand and India.[19]
India, the last country to deal with the SPDC post-Depayin
Indo-Burmese relations have improved remarkably in 2002. The Asian highway projects and other bilateral interests between the two countries made them closer than ever. India finally abandoned its policy of strongly rejecting the military government and lowest relations after 1988. India becomes the last actor of post Depayin ambush after Chinese distanced with the regime in regional forums. The Indian government has been closely watching for any bilateral relations and other developments between China and Burma since then. Indian foreign policy towards Burma might be reviewed based on weakening opposition effectiveness, following the Chinese influence in areas of economics and politics, and unavoidable economic coordination with SPDC. Thus, the old policy cannot be utilized with Burma.
Both countries have shown their willingness of having better relations during Indian Vice-President Bhairon Singh Shekhawat's state visit; he had held a series of talks with General Than Shwe in Rangoon the first week of November 2003. The Burmese counterpart also promised to eject the anti-Indian armed groups from the Indo-Burmese border. After the Vice president’s visit to Burma, there was harsh treatment towards Burmese refugees in India who protested in New Delhi.[20]
India’s main interest of having an Asian Highway from its Eastern border town Mora to Mae Sot in Thailand, and energy needs from natural gas[21] from Arakan state in Burma. Both economic interest and deeper relations, and reaching its influence with SPDC could provide the Indian government to play in the region effectively. The Indian government showed interest in promoting its national security, trade and economic coordination with the SPDC.[22]
The Indian interest of border trade, new highway project to Thailand has increased during the past few years, and to improve economy in eastern states are depending on Burma coordination in a very near future. Yet the Indians could not afford to lose the second opportunity with Burma in terms of having trade interest, regionalization, new market in ASEAN and China through Burma.
Conclusively, current development between KNU and the SPDC is not securing the regional stability and security that is wanted by ASEAN and China. But ASEAN seemed to withdraw its realistic approach to the SPDC until 2006 when Burma becomes a chair of the ASEAN. However, three neighboring countries are somewhat supporting the SPDC's post Depayin political development. India, China and Thailand have seen the Burma's political deadlock as a major obstacle to regional development and economic opportunity.
The SPDC's seven point roadmap and its National Convention and the new position of General Khin Nyunt were believed to have been decided in consultation with the Chinese during General Maung Aye’s visit to China in August 2003. Both General Than Shwe and General Maung Aye led SPDC military council and General Khin Nyunt's SPDC new cabinet working towards the marginalization of the NLD role in the political development. Both teams play harmonically on domestic and international concerns in the very beginning. Since the first week of October 2003, the local, state and division level USDA have organized the rally of supporting Khin Nyunt's seven points road map.[23] The SPDC has a grand strategy of reintroducing the national convention to avoid the political dialogue with the NLD in order to escape the international pressures.[24]
No matter how Western countries wish to see Burma’s transformation to democratization n faster way, these three countries have to consult with their interests first and they have to conduct political changes in Burma without affecting their economic and political interest. They cannot see Burma from the Western state’s perspective; moreover they have to pick the notion of Asian values as the best excuse for them not to pressure the barbaric regime. But they realize that without the NLD in the political process they could not bring the country development or any stability in the region in terms of lack of legitimacy of the SPDC.
[1] Far Eastern Economic Review 2003 Nov.17
[2] Dr Walden Bello "Possible scenarios of economic development in Burma" DHF workshop in Chiang Mai, Thailand, 15th December 2003
[3] The Cambodia Daily News, June 17th 2003
[4] Gen Than Shwe signed a statement and U Win Aung had to debrief of DASSK has planed to coup on 18th June 2004 to the neighboring countries and Japan.
[5] "ASEAN needs to make sure that this very issue [of Suu Kyi] will not steal the attention, both of ASEAN member countries themselves and the international community, about the important issues that will be addressed in the summit," said a media relations officer at Indonesia’s Foreign Ministry before Bali summit on 6th of October 2003. Irrawaddy Publishing Group
[6] Irrawaddy Online December 15, 2003
[7] The Nations, December 17th 2003
[8] Japan is ASEAN’s second-largest trading partner and investor, after the US. The group’s trade with Japan was worth an estimated US $122.9 billion in 2002. Japan supplied 60 percent of the region’s overseas aid in 2001.
[9] Khin Nyunt told the Japan Broadcasting Corp (NHK) on Monday that he wished Japan would earmark more economic assistance for his country. "To push for the democratization of our country, it is important that we build a solid economic foundation," he said. "Japan’s current economic assistance is not enough, but I believe Japan would extend a helping hand." New Light of Myanmar
[10] Gen Khin Nyunt told Gen Mya of KNU in Rangoon, Burma on KNU peace tour, Jan 2004
[11] Japan suspended economic assistance to Burma in June, after the military government detained opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi following a clash between her supporters and a pro-junta mob on May 30.
[12] ADB is a major pillar among the region’s developing countries to reducing the poverty level, catalyzing rural development, major investment in the infrastructures, educations and other health care along with other financial institutions.
[13] North-West Corridor of GMS economic program area covers Yunnan province of China, Burma, Laos and Thailand, which will finance building of major infrastructure, poverty reduction and hydro power programs
[14] Which covers Cambodia, Thailand and Burma and done pre-investment study and it showed that numerous trade and production opportunities if this program could start in before year of 2012.
[15] The Chinese authorities in Yunnan, September 2003
[16] China Morning News, December 4th, 2003
[17] Sinhu News Agency, 18 June 2003
[18] Yunnan province political research department
[19] Inter press service, Bangkok August 26. This was one of the key issues that emerged during last week's visit to China by Gen Maung Aye, Burma's second most important military leader. Although largely a military visit, China's leaders discussed Burma's internal situation at length with Gen Maung Aye. After all, he is one of the three men who run the country. It is the lack of economic development that is currently worrying China's policymakers. They fear economic shortages could lead to social unrest--and this is something that worries Beijing most.
[20] November 13, 2003—Over 70 people were hospitalized yesterday after Indian police crushed a demonstration by Burmese asylum seekers at the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) office in New Delhi, according to an eyewitness. IPG
[21] The exploration work in the block, designated A-1, is being carried out by two South Korean companies, Daewoo International and KOGAS, and two Indian state-owned companies, the Oil and Natural Gas Commission and the Gas Authority of India. GAIL India chairman Proshanto Banerjee said: "I expect commercial production to start in 2006-07. In the next 5-6 months, we will have to assess the availability of gas, the transport options and the route to take."
[22] India today announced a 57m-dollar line of credit to Myanmar (Burma), which gave an assurance that it would not allow its territory to be used for anti-India activities. "The India-Myanmar Joint Trade Committee has proposed to raise the turnover to $1 billion in the next three years through expansion and diversification of trade. This is a challenging but feasible task," Vice President BhaironSingh Shekhawat told the captains of Myanmarese industry. (Hindustan Times, Nov. 3, 2003)
[23] It hardly to say promoting of his own popularity is part of the anti-DASS strategy or his own intention. Since public relays were conducted throughout the country, the military intelligent personnel asked the NLD party members to support his in Shan, Kachin and Karenni states, and Mandalay and other upper Burma
[24] Freedom of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi was died down in the late 2003; his news covered most of the international and domestic. The SPDC could easily divide the Depayin crisis to roadmap in the ceasefire and other democratic forces inside and outside as well the regional countries, even the Burmese language media from the US and UK.
[HM1]What is the main point of this sentence: that all 3 countries have regional ambitions towards Burma …?
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