Sanctions work

Nyo Ohn Myint

May 29, 2007 (DVB)—If international economic and diplomatic sanctions against Burma's military had failed, the regime would be able to dismiss all political opponents as history.

Nevertheless, opposition is still going strong and the levels of political activity and pressure are still increasing in the country, regardless of the military's endless brutality.

The only significant sanctions against Burma's regime come from the US. The unwillingness of EU, ASEAN and other democratic countries to assert efficient political pressure may contribute to the regime's continuing refusal to accept positive political developments inside Burma.

Economic sanctions are not an end game solution. They are part of a process to achieve the type of environment where final solutions can be found and attained. At this very moment, sanctions are acting as a safeguard, putting a certain amount of economic and political pressure on the military.

Without sanctions and the global attention they create, the Burmese regime would have a free hand to oppress and brutalize its people without hesitation. Thus, the threat of sanctions against the Burmese government is both necessary and needed.
Since the US's isolation policy on Burma started in 1990, the junta has attracted direct investment from various industries all over the world. Bilateral economic ties with neighboring countries such as China and Thailand have been built, enabling the military to establish border trade with these two important allies.

However, the junta has been unable to improve its overall economic stability and development. Why? Regardless of the junta's attempts to normalize its bilateral relations with China and ASEAN, both refuse to invest in major projects that require heavy capital investments. They have instead tried to keep up border trade and create small-scale trading schemes within both the public and private sectors.
The junta's top generals, led by senior general Than Shwe, want to keep both political and economic power in the hands of the few top military members, frustrating economic players and failing to create the much-needed economic development in the country. Thus, the normalization of bilateral trade with its neighbors has not born fruit for the junta or the country's economy.

The junta's generals have been eager to normalize relations with the US government, soften the sanctions against them and marginalize the opposition. Former Prime Minister Khin Nyunt tried several times to approach the US government with the intention of trying to convince them to soften their sanctions policy without any actual political reforms inside Burma.

The SPDC hired a US public relations firm, DCI Associates, as lobbyists to try to normalize relations with the US in early 2000. The attempt failed hopelessly and the PR firm was dropped.

As a matter of fact, the US's limited sanctions alone have demonstrated to the junta, the need for an end to its iron-fisted policies on labor and human rights abuses. The junta wants to reduce the pressure coming from both international organizations and governments while giving false promises and trying to maintain its status quo position of ruling the county without legitimacy and brutally suppressing the opposition.

If the US-led sanctions against Burma's general were uniformly supported by other nations, particularly by the EU and other so-called civilized Western democracies, the results and the success rate would be much more tangible. The EU alone imported US $149.72 million worth of goods from Burma between January and October in 2006. Germany's share of this was $60.71 million.

Unlike North Korea, Burma's leaders face a major internal conflict with pro-democracy elements and ethnic nationalities groups. Neither Chinese and ASEAN diplomats, academics nor the handful of pro-SPDC observers can guarantee that without sanctions, the conditions inside Burma would improve and allow a political liberalization process or the reemergence of fundamental rights.

It can also be argued that the sanctions against the military junta have asserted certain pressures on the regime to reduce human rights abuses and push towards political reform. More than 70 percent of the population depends on agriculture and sanctions do not harm the agricultural sector. Unfortunately, many farmers have abandoned their land and are searching for a better life in Burma's neighboring countries.

The junta's iron rules and strict regulations and the state's monopoly imposed against poorer people, which prohibits free trade between states and townships, goes very much against its own propaganda on market economics and commercial liberalization.

The poor facilities from the paddy fields to the rice mill and the heavy restrictions on trading have discouraged farmers who have lost hope in their traditional profession and have started abandoning it altogether. Economic mismanagement and abuses cause constant economic downturns. Facing shortages in basic needs such as proper health care, education and social services, economic infrastructure and business incentives, Burma's urban dwellers lack the same opportunities to survive as their rural counterparts.

Sanctions are designed for complex political situations and have nothing to do with the junta's failed economic liberalization attempts. The junta never reinvests its export revenues but keeps spending on defense and security measures—more than $1 billion has been spent on the extension of the defense forces while less than three percent of the GDP has gone to education and health.

Indeed, sanctions may not produce instant results, especially when they are aimed at authoritarian regimes such as the SPDC, but the attention they create prevents millions of human rights abuses and forced labor cases. Some consider Burma to be a regional threat and ASEAN countries fear that Burma will tarnish the region's image. China stubbornly continues to categorize the situation in Burma as a 'domestic issue.'

If, or indeed when, Burma's domestic problems worsen and the conflict spreads across the region, China and ASEAN will feel the heat and may wish that they had taken a much more serious look at sanctions.

By that time it may be too late. Only time will tell.